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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
JOYCE M. DESPAIN, ) 
) 
Plaintiff and ) 
Respondent, ) 
) 
v. ) No. 17034 
) 
ROBERT V. DESPAIN, ) 
) 
Defendant and ) 
Appellant. ) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an order denying appellant's 
motion for termination of child support payments under a 
decree of divorce. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant filed a motion to modify the provisions of 
the divorce decree which required him to pay child support 
to his two children while they were full-time students and 
residing with respondent. Specifically, appellant's motion 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
was that the decree be modified to terminate appellant's 
responsibility to make payments after his children reached 
age 21. The district judge denied appellant's motion. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the district judge's 
ruling denying appellant's motion for modification of the 
divorce decree. 
However, if the court grants the modification of the 
decree the appellant seeks, respondent requests the court 
to remand for a full review of the entire divorce decree. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent agrees with the statement of facts set 
forth in appellant's brief except she does not agree with 
appellant's characterization of the judicial decisions 
appellant refers to. Those decisions, discussed below in 
ARGUMENT, POINTS I and II, do not apply to a divorce decree 
based on a property settlement agreement. Furthermore, 
those decisions did not establish a new principle of law. 
-2-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ALTHOUGH A COURT MAY NOT ORDER 
CHILD SUPPORT BEYOND THE CHILD'S 
AGE OF MAJORITY, A COURT MAY 
ENFORCE A VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT 
FOR SUCH SUPPORT. 
Appellant correctly states that absent special circum-
stances a parent "has no duty to support his children beyond 
the age of 18." Appellant's Brief on Appeal at 6. Appellant 
argues that this rule requires that the decree in this case be 
modified. In making this argument appellant overlooks the 
importance of the distinction between an order of the court made 
after trial and a voluntary agreement of the parties which is 
accepted by the court and incorporated into the decree. Although 
the law does not impose a child support duty beyond the child's 
age of majority absent unusual circumstances, Carlson v. Carlson 
584 P.2d 864 (Utah 1978), a parent is free to voluntarily under-
take this responsibility by agreement. 
In spite of the general rule that a divorce court cannot 
order the support of an adult child, 
the parents may agree that the father shall 
support a child after majority, as where the 
father is to support a child until he or she 
graduates from college, or until the child 
becomes self-supporting, and the court may 
adopt such an agreement and require the father 
to comply with the decree. 
24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation §832 (1966) (emphasis 
added) (footnote omitted). 
In the case of Robrock v. Robrock, 150 N.E.2d 421 
(Ohio 1958), the court held: 
-1-
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Where, as part of a valid agreement, 
a husband agrees to provide a college educa-
tion for his children and further agrees to 
keep in effect insurance policies on his life 
in which such children are beneficiaries, and 
where such agreement is incorporated in a 
decree divorcing the husband from his wife, such 
decree becomes binding upon the husband even 
though the performance required by the decree may 
extend beyond the minority of the children. 
Id. at 422-23. "We are of the.opinion," the court stated, 
"that such agreements should not be impaired for the reason 
that the court, if acting without such agreement, would not 
have the authority to impose such an obligation." Id. at 428. 
The validity of the holding of Robrock was recently reaffirmed 
and relied on in Grant v. Grant, 396 N.E.2d 1037 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1977) .. 
In White v. White, 223 S.E.2d 377 (N.C. 1976), it was held 
that "a court may enforce by contempt proceedings its order, 
entered by consent, that child support payments be made beyond 
the time for which there is a duty to provide support." Id. at 
379. In the recent Colorado case of Haynes v. Haynes, 586 P.2d 
1010 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978), the court upheld a decree adopting 
a property settlement agreement requiring support for post-high 
school education. In the Kansas case of Clark v. Chipman, 510 
P.2d 1257 (Kan. 1973), the court sanctioned the validity of a 
divorce decree which incorporated a property settlement requiring 
the husband to pay for the college education of his children 
"'regardless of their age.'" Id. at 1261. 
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Appellant argues that upholding the parties agreement in 
this case would discourage future property settlements. 
Appellant's Brief on Appeal at 9. On the contrary, such a 
holding would actually encourage property settlements. This 
was recognized by the court in Robrock when it explained why 
divorce decrees adopting agreements such as this should be 
enforced: 
It is entirely possible, perhaps probable, 
that a wife may be willing to give up, by way 
of agreement with her husband, much to which 
she would be entitled in consideration of the 
husband doing more than he might be required 
to do for their children. To disregard such 
agreements when incorporated in a divorce 
decree, at least so far as the power of the 
court to enforce them is concerned, would dis-
courage the settlement of differences between 
husband and wife or reduce such agreements, 
when made, to cloaks to be put on or shed at 
will. 
Robrock v. Robrock, 150 N.E.2d 421, 427 (Ohio 1958). 
The Utah Supreme Court has explicitly recogniz~d that 
decrees based on property settlement agreements must be given 
special treatment. In Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980), 
the court noted that although a decree based on an agreement is 
modifiable, 
when a decree is based upon a property 
settlement agreement, forged by the parties 
and sanctioned by the court, equity must 
take such agreement into consideration. 
Equity is not available to reinstate rights 
and privileges voluntarily contracted away 
simply because one has come to regret the 
bargain made. Accordingly, the law limits 
-5-
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the continuing jurisdiction of the court 
where a property settlement .agreement has 
been incorporated into the decree, and the 
outright abrogation of the provisions of such 
an agreement is only to be resorted to with 
great reluctance and for compelling reasons. 
Id. at 1250-51 (footnotes omitted). In the present case, the 
district judge acted properly by giving deference to the agree-
ment freely entered into by the parties. Although the district 
judge had discretion to modify the parties' agreement in this 
case, he did not abuse his discretion by refusing to do so. 
In the relief appellant seeks he implicitly recognizes that 
a court can enforce an agreement to provide support where a duty 
could not otherwise be imposed. Appellant has requested modifi-
cation of the decree but "has accepted that pursuant to his 
agreement, support should continue to ~ge 21." Appellant's 
Brief on Appeal at 9 (emphasis added). Since, in the absence of 
special circumstances, a court cannot order support peyond age 18, 
appellant has taken an inconsistent position in making this 
request. By so doing, appellant has clearly recognized that the 
rule which prevents a court from ordering child support beyond 
the child's age of majority does not destroy the right of a 
father to voluntarily agree to provide such support. 
Appellant cites three cases in support of the principle 
that absent special or unusual circumstances a parent has no 
duty to support his children beyond the age of 18: English v. 
English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977); Carlson v. Carlson, 584 P.2d 
864 (Utah 1978); and Harris v. Harris, 585 P.2d 435 (Utah 1978). 
-6-
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While these cases do support that principle, they go no furth~r. 
In none of these cases did the court face a situation where the 
order in question was based upon an agreement between the parties. 
Appellant then cites Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1980) 
in further support of this principle. However, as in the other 
cases cited by appellant, in Kerr there was no agreement between 
the parties. 
Appellant cites Ferguson v. Ferguson, 578 P.2d 1274 (Utah 1978), 
for the proposition that a court has no power, absent compelling 
special circumstances, to order a parent to pay for his child's 
college education. The Ferguson case is likewise not on point. 
In Ferguson the child's mother was seeking a modification of a 
divorce decree to require her former husband to continue to make 
support payments to her daughter beyond age 18, apparently to 
finance her college education. Unlike the present case, the 
parties had made no agreement that such support would be provided. 
An important distinction between a decree of the court 
which is based on an agreement of the parties and one that is 
not was recognized in Ferguson. In affirming the trial court's 
refusal to order child support beyond the age of 18, the court 
explained, 
Ordinarily a parent will be more than 
willing to aid and assist an adult child in 
securing a college education; however, one 
should not be compelled to do so by court 
order, except perhaps in some unusual circum-
stance, not present here. If he does not 
-7-
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have the interests of his children at heart, 
that is and should be a matter of his own 
conscience and not of the court's. 
Id. at 1275 (emphasis added). 
In the present case, appellant was not compelled by the 
court to accept the obligation of supporting his two children 
during their college education. This was a responsibility he 
freely and voluntarily entered into as part of the 1976 property 
settlement agreement. The rule that a court cannot order child 




THERE WAS NO RELEVANT, SUBSTANTIAL 
CHANGE IN THE LAW BETWEEN THE ENTRY 
OF THE DIVORCE DECREE AND APPELLANT'S 
MOTION TO MODIFY THE DECREE. DURING 
THAT PERIOD THE SUPREME COURT MERELY 
ARTICULATED MORE CLEARLY A WELL-
ESTABLI SHED RULE. 
Appellant characterizes the cases of English v. English, 
565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977); Carlson v. Carlson, 584 P.2d 864 (Utah 
1978); and Harris v. Harris, 585 P.2q 435 (Utah 1978) as estab-
lishing "a substantial change in the law which require[s] a re-
examination of the Decree." Appellant's Brief on Appeal at 5. 
It is true that these cases did clearly articulate the principle 
that a parent, absent special circumstances, has no duty to 
support his children beyond the age of their majority. However, 
this principle was not a new one. 
In Carlson, the court described it as a "time-honored 
and universally recognized rule that when a child reaches the 
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age of majority, the child becomes emancipated and the legal 
obligation of the parents to support the child and the reci-
procal legal obligation of the child to the family, terminate." 
Carlson v. Carlson, 584 P.2d 864, 865 (Utah 1978) (footnote 
omitted). 
In Dehm v. Dehm, 545 P.2d 525 (Utah 1976) the court held 
that a court may extend the child support obligation beyond the 
age of majority upon a showing of special circumstances. The 
clear implication of Dehm, decided and published ten months 
before the entry of the divorce decree in the present case, was 
that absent such special circumstances the court could not 
impose such a duty. 
Thus, since there was no relevant change of law, uhe cited 
decisions of the Utah Supreme Court created no relevant change 
of circumstances requiring a modification of the decree. 
POINT III 
EVEN IF THERE WAS A CHANGE IN THE 
LAW, THE PARTICULAR CHANGE ASSERTED 
BY APPELLANT IS NOT A MATERIAL 
CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WOULD 
REQUIRE MODIFICATION OF THE DECREE. 
Child support provisions of divorce decrees are modifiable 
under Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(1) (Supp. 1979). Appellant cites 
no authority to support his assertion that a change of law can 
constitute a change of circumstances requiring such modification. 
Nor does appellant show how the supposed change of law in this 
case would be material to the divorce decree involved here. 
-9-
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"In order that a change of circumstances may be deemed 
sufficient to overcome the principle of res judicata it must be 
substantial and material." 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and 
Separation §847 (1966) (footnotes omitted). Even if the 
decisions cited by appellant are considered to represent a 
change in the law, the only changed circumstance would be 
that whereas before these decisions appellant might have believed 
a court might order child support beyond the age of 18 absent 
special circumstances, after these decisions appellant would 
know that a court could not. This kind of changed circumstance 
would not be material to the modification of the divorce decree. 
First, it would not be material because, as discussed 
above, the principle enunciated in the cited decisions does not 
apply to an agreed-upon property· settlement. 
Second, the change would not be material because the 
ultimate tests a court must apply in considering a motion to 
modify a child support decree are "the needs of the child and 
the ability of the father to pay." Id. (footnote omitted). 
See generally Owen v. Owen, 579 P.2d 911, 913 (Utah 1978) 
(considering "the needs of the children and the ability of the 
father and mother to provide for them"}. When these circumstances 
change, the decree is modifiable. In the present case, however, 
no such circumstances have changed. The asserted change in the 
law has nothing to do with the children's needs or the parents' 
ability to pay. 
-10-
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POINT IV 
IF AN ESSENTIAL TERM OF THE 
DIVORCE DECREE IS MODIFIED, 
THE ENTIRE DECREE SHOULD BE 
REVIEWED AND REVISED. 
The complaint in this case was filed on November 15, 1973. 
It was not until three years later, on November 24, 1976, after 
a lengthy period of detailed bargaining, that the terms of the 
property settlement were finally agreed upon. In addition to 
providing for child support, the agreement specifically provided 
for the disposition of motor vehicles, the home, securities, 
rights in a limited partnership, certain liqueur glasses, and 
a particular painting. It specifically provided for life insurance, 
medical insurance, and dental expenses. Eacb element.of the agree-
ment was carefully considered and negotiated, and each element was 
an important part of the consideration for the entire agreement. 
The modification of child support and property distribution 
provisions of a divorce decree must be reasonable. Utah Code 
Ann. §30-3-5(1) (Supp. 1979). In this case it would not be 
reasonable to abrogate that portion of the agreement which 
provides that the appellant shall assist with his children's 
college education without reviewing the effect of this change on 
the other terms of the agreement. As in Robrock, it is possible 
that the respondent in this case gave up "much to which she would 
be entitled in consideration of the husband doing more than he 
might be required to do for the children." Robrock v. Robrock, 
150 N.E.2d 421, 427 (Ohio 1958). Since this provision for 
-11-
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continued child support was a bargained-for term which became an 
essential and material part of the divorce settlement, if it is 
to be changed there should be a full review of the entire 
divorce settlement and not merely one aspect of it. 
Although a contractual arrangement can be modified, "the 
law does not countenance a change in the contractual status 
which would result in unfair advantage to one or impose an undue 
burden on the other . " 17A C.J.S. Contracts §373 (1963). 
To allow the modification appellant seeks without reviewing its 
effects on the entire property settlement would give appellant 
an unfair advantage and unfairly burden respondent with a financial 
responsibility which was not originally intended to be hers 
under the terms of the agreement. 
The law concerning the partial termination and partial 
rescission of contracts is analogous to the situation presented 
here. "Usually a partial termination of a contract is not 
favored by the courts unless the parties have expressly agreed 
thereto." 17A C.J.S. Contracts §403 (1963) (footnote omitted). 
Similarly, "[a] rescission of a contract generally must be in 
toto. A party cannot affirm it in part and repudiate it in 
part. He cannot accept the benefits on the one hand while he 
shirks its disadvantages on the other." Id. §416 (footnote 
omitted). See Pickinpaugh v. Morton, 519 P.2d 91, 95 (Ore. 
1974). A partial rescission is generally only possible "where 
the parts of a contract are so severable from each other as to 
-12-
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form independent contracts." 17A C.J.S. Contracts §416 (1963) 
(footnote omitted). The child support provisions of the 
property settlement agreement in this case do not form a 
separate contract. They are an integral part of the entire 
agreement. The abrogation of a portion of the agreement without 
a re-examination of the entire agreement would unfairly benefit 
appellant and deprive respondent of her bargained-for 
consideration. 
CONCLUSION 
The order of the district judge in favor of respondent 
should be affirmed. The rule that a court may not order child 
support beyond the child's age of majority does not prevent a 
court from enforcing a voluntary agreement to provide such 
support. The cases which articulate this rule did not change 
the law, but even if they did, such a change would not be 
the kind of changed circumstance which would require the 
modification of the parties' property settlement agreement. 
If the order of the district judge is not affirmed and 
the child support provisions of the property settlement 
-13-
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agreement are modified, the court should order a full review of 
the entire property settlement agreement to prevent an unjust 
result. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this~ day of August, 1980. 
GREENE, CALLISTER & NEBEKER 
/.'· J./ , ;/ 1 .,,.r / / 11 
- , ,.. ,,,,. .,,;.-/ -- -.',;./I,,· -
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Attorneys for Respondent 
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